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RELIGION - THE NATURE OF THE BEAST 
 
By Michel Clasquin 
 
What is religion? In a book about religion, Christianity and the New Testament, it might well be a good 
idea to start out with a clear idea of what we are looking at. It is only too obvious today that there are 
different religions, churches, denominations and sects. So let us ask ourselves, what is "religion", what 
does it mean when we say that a person is "religious" and don't all the religions worship the same God 
in their own way, in any case? 
 
One could argue that it is obvious what religion is. After all, I am religious, I believe this and that and I 
do such and such, therefore that is what makes something a religion and therefore RELIGION itself. It 
may be so. But let us try an analogy: a capitalist might define "economics" as "the interchange of goods 
and services in a free market." That would be an answer of sorts, but an answer that simply ignores 
Marx's analysis of human exploitation, Keynes's advocacy of state involvement in the economy, the 
experience of millions of people in rigidly-controlled command economies ... the list is endless. Clearly, 
one cannot simply extrapolate such a general statement about either economics or religion from one's 
own beliefs and experiences. 
 
Even so, might it not be possible to take one's own experience, strip it down to its most basic essentials, 
see whether those same essentials also apply to other religions and create a workable definition of 
religion from that? Many have tried this approach, and have come up with answers such as "religion is 
the worship of a divine being or beings" or, more broadly, "religion is the human response to that which 
is considered sacred". 
 
However, if we dig a little deeper in the various religions of the world, we come up with a number of 
problems. Let us first tackle some basic beliefs. Christians, Jews, Muslims and many others all claim to 
believe in the existence of a single god who created the world and everything in it, but disagree strongly 
with each other and among themselves about the details of this being, not to mention what He or She 
might require of humans. Hindus respond that, in their view, a monotheistic setup is fair enough, but 
there is also something to be said for incorporating some aspects of polytheism, at least on a subordinate 
level.  
 
In the final analysis some of them might also agree with the Buddhists that the ultimate nature of reality 
is devoid of personality and that its beginning and end, if such things were to exist, are lost in the mists 
of time. And the Chinese sage Confucius once replied to this whole debate by saying, "You do not yet 
know how to serve people, why then worry about serving the gods?" 
 
But if basic beliefs about the world and its origin do not help us along in our search for the meaning of 
"religion", perhaps we can find something else that all religions have in common. I am not referring to 
acts like praying, lighting candles or prostrating - there the differences are all too clear - but perhaps 
there is something uniquely religious about ethics. After all, don't all religions teach people not to go 
around killing, raping and robbing each other? 
 
Well, in a sense they all do, but only in highly selective ways. Christians are told to "turn the other 
cheek", but Islam values a somewhat tougher attitude. Buddhists will extend, in theory at least, their 
nonharming attitude to all living beings, then indulge in endless debates among themselves whether this 
implies compulsory vegetarianism. The sacrifice of large numbers of human beings was an integral part 
of Aztec religion. Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant Christians disagree among themselves on the 
sinfulness of suicide and abortion. And hardly ever has any religion succeeded in preventing the 
miseries of war; to the contrary, almost all of them have had a hand, at one time or another, in starting 
wars against people who happened to be heretics, pagans, heathens, infidels or apostates, in other words, 
"not like us". However devoted we are to our respective traditions, we must face up to the truth: 
  
 
"Religionism", like racism and sexism, has caused untold suffering for millions of people. 
 
So, if there is indeed a common factor that not only unites all the religions but also helps us to 
understand what, essentially, it is, it is not plain to see. What about the structure of the word itself? The 
word "religion" is derived from a Latin source that means "to tie back" or more figuratively "to 
re-connect". But this does not help us much, either; the question immediately arises "reconnect to 
what?" and we are back in the interminable debate about the existence, or otherwise, of God, the nature 
of reality and what human beings really are. In Afrikaans, as in its close relative Dutch, the most 
common term is "godsdiens", literally "service to God". Clearly the same problem arises, for the 
existence of God is presupposed in the very term itself. For this reason, Afrikaans-speaking scholars 
active in Religious Studies have turned instead to the neutral, if somewhat artificial, term "religie". 
 
There are three possible reactions to this dilemma. First, I can say that while all other traditions are 
man-made and false, my own is divinely inspired and true. In other words, my beliefs are the TRUTH, 
while all others are mere "religions". While this approach has the virtues of frankness and simplicity, it 
is also true that it leads to a fanaticism and a disregard for the rights of others that would no doubt have 
horrified the founder of the religion in question. This strategy seems most common among monotheists. 
 
A more subtle variation of this strategy is to declare that all religions have a certain amount of truth in 
them, but mine happens to be the completely fulfilled truth, which has emerged after a long evolution. 
Alternatively, if this is not yet the case, my religion is at least the closest approach to this complete truth 
that will be revealed in the fullness of time. This strategy has long been a favourite among Hindus and 
Buddhists, but it seems also to have taken root in certain sectors of twentieth-century Christianity: one 
thinks here of Raimundo Pannikar's phrase "The unknown Christ of Hinduism". But while this strategy 
may be more refined than the "only my religion is the truth" approach, it is imperialistic in nature. It 
refuses to take other people seriously, preferring instead to remake them in its own image. 
 
The second major way of reacting to the problem of the differences between religions is to declare that 
the only true religion is mysticism. Mysticism may be defines as a process whereby the mystic plumbs 
the depths of the self and reality in a radical process of meditative self-discovery to discover the true 
nature of reality experientially. And the sayings of mystics of all kinds of different traditions show that 
they have known very similar experiences. Therefore, the true unity of religion can be found in mystical 
experience. In mysticism, we can find the "perennial philosophy", the common ground of all religious 
experience. 
 
There is a lot of evidence to support this train of thought. But mysticism, at least in the narrow 
definition of the term used here, is, was and probably always will be a minority interest among religious 
people. Where does this leave the rest of us? Moreover, the mysticism approach and the "only my 
religion is the truth" attitude share another shortcoming: there is no way that they can be proven to a 
disinterested outsider. Instead, they require a leap of faith or a mystical experience that is itself 
religious. Thus, basing a definition of religion on them leads to arguing in circles. 
 
The third reaction to the problem is to ignore it. This approach, which grows naturally out of the 
exclusivism of the first strategy, was perhaps possible in certain periods in the past, when religions 
dominated large areas almost entirely. But today, it would imply shutting oneself up in a self-imposed 
ghetto, avoiding all contact with everyone who might possibly not share one's beliefs and never 
venturing outside. Surely an unacceptable "solution" to most of us. After all, most religions do believe 
that their message is valid for all people; how is this truth to be transmitted to other people if we ignore 
them? 
 
So perhaps there is a fourth way, a way of approaching the differences between religions that will not 
deny the religious feelings and beliefs, and therefore the very humanity, of people of other faiths and 
that will not restrict us in the practice of our own religion. 
  
 
 
One could examine some concrete cases. When the early European explorers set out on their voyages in 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, they already had some idea of what religion was. This notion was 
derived mostly from Christianity, but they were also aware of Judaism and Islam, even if they regarded 
these as false religions. When they reached India, they encountered certain systematised beliefs and 
practices that bore a sufficient resemblance to what they were used to at home for them to refer to this as 
the "religion" of the Indian people. The same was true when, later, they reached China and the 
Americas. In each of these cases, there were separate social structures that were not necessarily identical 
to European religion, but which bore a certain "family resemblance" to it. With each discovery of a new 
"religion", the very term itself was widened and it became easier and easier to describe a 
newly-discovered social phenomenon as "religious".  
 
Sometimes this process would break down, of course - some of the early missionaries to Southern 
Africa would write in their letters home that the indigenous people of Africa had no religion! Actually, 
what happened was that those activities that would be considered "religious" in western society were, in 
African communities, so tightly integrated with the rest of social life as to present a seamless whole to 
the observer. To some extent, this is also true of Judaism and Hinduism. Even in modern western 
society, it is not always easy to say where religion stops and, say, politics begins. 
 
The second concrete example concerns a more recent event. In November 1992, the South African 
branch of the World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP), an interrelations organisation, 
convened a conference in Pretoria to finalise and accept the Declaration of Religious Rights and 
Responsibilities, the culmination of two years of negotiation between members of many different 
religions. There were delegates from the Baha'i faith, Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and 
Judaism. In fact, most of these were represented by delegates from different subdivisions of their 
religions (eg Roman Catholic Church, Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, Zion Christian Church etc for 
the Christians) along with representatives from the academic study of religion and from the 
interreligious movement. In all, there were about a hundred participants. 
 
Although the Declaration was primarily a sociopolitical rather than a theological or religioscientific 
document, it was felt to be necessary to commence with a definition. It was not easy to arrive at a 
definition that was acceptable to all. The end result of two years of inviting comments and suggestions 
and of six hours of hard negotiation was as follows: 
 
(We) understand, for the purpose of this declaration, a religious community to mean a group of 
people who follow a particular system of belief, morality and worship, either in recognition of a 
divine being, in the pursuit of spiritual development, or in the expression of a sense of belonging 
through social custom and ritual ... 
 
Technically, you will see that this is a definition of a religious community rather than of religion itself, 
but there is nevertheless a definition of religion hidden within it. This definition consists of two parts; 
first it describes what religious people do and second, why they do these things. 
 
Firstly, then, it is stated that religion consists of "a particular system of belief, morality and worship". 
This is still open to criticism, as certain forms of Hindu, Buddhist and Taoist meditation can only be 
seen as "worship" by analogy. Perhaps an "or" instead of "and" would have been more suitable here.  
 
This is precisely what we see in the second half of the definition where it is stated that religious people 
believe and do these things either for this reason or for another or for yet another. One of the Muslim 
representatives suggested that the form "and/or" be used, as he felt that even "or" was too exclusive - 
after all, Muslims recognise both the "recognition of a divine being" and "the pursuit of spiritual 
development" as inseparable parts of their religion. This suggestion was rejected by the drafting 
committee on the grounds that it would be stylistically clumsy and that each religious tradition, however 
  
 
diverse, still showed a preference for one of these three objectives, its main focus, as it were. In 
Christianity, for instance, both "the pursuit of spiritual development" and "the expression of a sense of 
belonging through social custom and ritual" are common enough and recognised as important aspects of 
the faith, but the main focus of Christianity is surely on "recognition of a divine being". 
 
The three objectives of religion were not chosen at random: "recognition of a divine being" was 
intended to represent the theistic faiths of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, certain aspects of Hinduism and 
many others. "The pursuit of spiritual development" was inserted at the insistence of one of the 
Buddhist representatives, in order to acknowledge the nontheistic religions (most forms of Buddhism, 
Taoism, Jainism and certain forms of Hinduism), while "the expression of a sense of belonging through 
social custom and ritual" was specifically intended to recognise African Traditional Religion. 
Admittedly, there are flaws in this part of the definition, too. For instance, no provisions were made for 
true polytheists, simply since none were present at the conference to speak up. But the one great merit of 
this definition was that it was acceptable to so many representatives of so many different religious 
traditions. 
 
A similar approach is taken by the scholar of religion Frederick Streng in his book "Understanding 
religious life". He identifies four traditional and five less traditional "ways of being religious", 
acknowledging all the while that each one of these "ways" may be present in each specific religious 
tradition to a greater or lesser degree. No one characteristic is set up as the "essence" of religion. 
 
From these two examples we can see that it is not easy to identify the one thing that all religions are and 
must be. Still, if we cannot identify one common characteristic of all religions, perhaps we can devise a 
system of classifying them, much as was done in the WCRP definition above. Then, perhaps the way we 
classified the religions will itself show us what they have in common. 
 
There are many ways to classify religions. One way is to distinguish between local, national and 
universal religions. The local religion is limited in terms of both geography and missionary intent. 
Usually, one is born into a local religion; it is the faith of one's family, tribe or clan and one has little 
interest in extending it to others. To the contrary, since the religion is the source of the group's power, 
and therefore its means of survival, one should be careful not to divulge too much of it to outsiders. 
While this type of religion is most common among "primal" communities (hunter-gatherers, herders and 
premodern agriculturalists), remnants of it remain even in modern societies - witness the secrecy that 
surrounds quasi-religious groups such as the Freemasons.  
 
National religions usually have to do with the common bonds of a shared language, culture, ethnic 
background or a shared history. Orthodox Judaism is a good example of this. While it is not impossible 
for an outsider to join a national religion, to do so requires that one adopts, not only the religious 
precepts, but an entire lifestyle. As a result, national religions tend, after an initial flowering that is 
associated with the growth and political dominance of the associated community, to stop growing and 
only perpetuate themselves, or even to decline. 
 
The universal religions, on the other hand, have divorced themselves from a specific society to such an 
extent that they have become "portable". They can adapt themselves to almost any society in which they 
find themselves. Universal religions are clearly oriented towards converting people of other faiths. 
Christianity, Buddhism and Islam are the most often quoted examples of universal religions. Keep in 
mind, though, that there are always "mixed" types. For instance, Hinduism contains aspects of all three 
these types, depending on whether one investigates it on the village, caste or philosophical level. 
 
But there is a problem with this classification system, useful as it is, if we are looking for the essence of 
religion. It simply classifies traditions according to their missionary zeal, or lack of it. In terms of this 
system, classical Marxism-Leninism, with its drive to "world communism" would have to be classified 
as a "universal religion". While there are some scholars who maintain that it was precisely that, it is 
  
 
problematic to call this philosophy, which denied the truth-claims of all religious systems, a religion. In 
other words, we cannot use this classification to define religion as something that tries to convert other 
people. 
 
Yet another approach is to have a look at the basic beliefs of the various religions and base our system 
of classification on them. One common outcome of this approach is to divide religion into theism, 
atheism and non-theism. However, atheism is not a completely integral approach, but rather a rejection 
of an already existing theism. That leaves us with theism, which can be divided into monotheism and 
polytheism, and non-theism, which one could define as the opinion that belief in a divine being is not 
necessary for the functioning of a religion. Examples of theism include Christianity and Islam, of 
non-theism Buddhism and Taoism. You will notice the similarity to two aspects of the WCRP 
definition. 
 
But note that this classification hinges on the idea that the acceptance or non-acceptance of a personal 
god is a very important aspect of religion. This is itself a theistic idea. If a Buddhist scholar of religion 
were to classify the world's religions according to their basic beliefs, it would make more sense for him 
or her to classify them according to whether or not these traditions accepted the impermanence of 
phenomena, the nonexistence of an enduring soul or self in human beings and the unsatisfactoriness of 
all experience. 
 
What the above examples teach us is that we can never look at religious phenomena with a blank mind, 
ready to receive "what is there". Our previous experience always colours our perceptions, just as those 
early European explorers left on their voyages with a pre-existing idea of what religion was all about. 
Not that this is fatal to good thinking, as long as the reality of the influence of this previous experience 
is recognised and used positively. Thus, classification systems, although useful, cannot give us the 
essence of religion, either. All they do is reflect our existing ideas about religion. 
 
What can we learn from all this? Simply that religion is not a single thing. To understand religion, we 
must accept that it is a composite, something made up out of many things, any one (or even more!) of 
which may be present or absent without affecting the "religious" nature of the object under scrutiny. We 
cannot isolate a single aspect such as belief or worship or prayer and set that apart as "the essence of 
religion".  
 
Compare in this respect the work of the philosopher Wittgenstein in his later years. What, he asked, is a 
game? Many games are played with balls and sticks, but chess is a game, yet it involves neither. Games 
are played for fun, unless you happen to be a professional sportsman who does it for the money even 
when you are injured. Games can involve competition, but some others stress cooperation. And so on. 
In the end, he decided that "game" could not be reduced to one single defining attribute. Instead, it was 
the sum total of all its attributes. In a specific instance, if one looked at a human activity and saw that 
the majority of its attributes complied with the list that together made up the definition of "game", then 
one would be justified in saying that that particular activity was a game. Can you see how the same is 
true of religion? 
 
But if there is no single, substantial definition of religion, does this not also imply that there can be no 
one way of studying religion? Indeed, no longer can we simply pick out one methodology and state 
authoritatively that it is the "right" way. In the twentieth century, scholars have become aware that one's 
choice of methodology is not inherent in the material under scrutiny, but that it reflects nothing so much 
as the investigator's own attitude towards the material, just as we have seen above concerning 
classifications of religion. 
 
There are a number of such methodologies available to the researcher, and you will study some of them 
in detail further on in this book. I name but a few: historical criticism, which attempts to re-set a text in 
its original historical context; structuralism, which tries to trace nonhistorical connections between the 
  
 
myths and rituals of very different peoples; phenomenology, an effort to see the religious reality of other 
people as they themselves see it; and deconstruction, a radical attempt to see a text in a playful 
relationship with its reader. And, of course, each major religious tradition has evolved its own set of 
traditional exegetical rules for explaining its own scriptures. In time, the more modern methods may 
well become so commonplace that we will no longer know how we ever managed without them. They 
will then be part and parcel of the traditional exegetical system. This seems to be happening already in 
the case of historical criticism. 
 
Certain requirements do remain; logical coherence, willingness to be proven wrong, not adjusting the 
facts of the case in an ad hoc way to make it fit into one's preferred methodological scheme. But beyond 
this, it is no longer possible to say that, for instance, the historical critical method of studying religion is 
"wrong". Any method that is internally consistent, logically sound and that maintains an attitude of 
respect towards the subject will deliver results that are completely correct within the framework of that 
method. 
 
It is always possible to contend that a particular method was not applied correctly, and one can also 
criticise a method itself from a higher philosophical point of view. However, it is no longer permissible 
to see the results of, for instance, a structuralist analysis as invalid because its results invalidate the 
results of traditional scriptural exegesis, or vice versa. Like the definitions of "game" and "religion", the 
study of religion is the sum total of all efforts made within it, and is forever incomplete, a human search 
for the certainty that forever eludes us, yet nevertheless a noble attempt to improve our understanding of 
this elusive thing called "religion". 
 
And the same must then be true in our personal religious practice: my bona fide religious experience is 
completely valid within the framework of my religious tradition, and so is your religious experience 
within the framework of yours. The fact that my religious experience is not the same as yours, or that 
our religious systems completely contradict each other, does not alter the fact that on the experiential 
level each of us has experienced a life-altering event of the deepest possible meaning. All of us, the 
Catholic and the Copt, the Buddhist and the Baptist, stand before the Great Mystery, begging bowl in 
hand, dumbfounded by the greatness of what we can see only dimly. 
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